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WHAT KIND OF ENVIRONMENT DO WE OWE
FUTURE GENERATIONS?
by
Neil H. Buchanan
Despite widely held beliefs that currentgenerations bear heavy obligations
to look outfor the welfare offuture generations, the philosophicalcase in
support of such intergenerationalobligations is surprisingly tentative.
Moreover, quantifying any such obligations is subject to even greater
uncertainty. Even so, current generations bringfuture generations into
existence in the knowledge that doing so will put a claim on resources
that could have been used to reduce suffering among people who are
already alive. The choice to allow living people to suffer and die, and
instead to bringforth more people in the future, thus implies a moral
imperative to provide a life forfuture generations that is worth living.
Many policies-such as so-called green technologies-that could
improve the lives of future generations could bring about greater
prosperity for current generations as well. The potentially difficult policy
choices are those that represent a clear trade-off: decreasing future
generations' living standards as a means of providing current and
future generations with a better environment. Because future material
living standards are projected-even under the most pessimistic
scenarios-to be much higher than living standards today, it is possible
to give future generationsboth a better environment and a much higher
material standard of living than people enjoy today. Claiming that proenvironmental policies will harm future generations, therefore, amounts
to observing that it would be possible to give future generations even
higher incomes-along with a dirty planet. We should, therefore, not be
hesitant to transform some future materialprosperity into an inheritance
that will truly benefitfuture generations: a livable world.
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INTRODUCTION

Politicians in the United States love grandchildren. At least, they love
to talk about how much they love grandchildren. In virtually every policy
debate in the United States, each side invokes the interests of the current
generation's children and grandchildren.' In some situations, it is only
the next two generations that are under discussion, because the policy in
question will affect everyone who is alive today; but in others, the phrase
"children and grandchildren" serves as a proxy for all future generations,
born and not yet born.' Politicians who appeal to the interests of future
generations, of course, hope to claim the moral high ground by showing
that their preferred policies will protect helpless innocents, that is, those
future citizens who literally cannot yet participate in the political process,
and whose futures will be significantly shaped by the decisions made by
today's adults. No sensible public figure, therefore, would wish to be seen
as ignoring the interests of future generations.5
Despite universal claims that political decisions must be made in the
interests of future generations, policies in the United States continue to
allow human activity to create serious and growing damage to the
' See, e.g., Katherine Ling, CAMPAIGN 2010: Obama Trying to Turn Election Tide
with 'Clean Energy'Emphasis,GREENWIRE (Oct. 4, 2010), http://www.eenews.net/public
/Greenwire/2010/10/04/1 ("[M]y administration has made an historic commitment
to promote clean energy technology.. . . We're putting Americans to work producing
clean, homegrown American energy that will help lower our reliance on foreign oil
and protect our planet for future generations.").
2 See, e.g., Hearing on S. 1733, the Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act Before the
S. Comm. on Env't & Pub. Works, 111th Cong. (2009), availableat CIS S 32-20091028-01
(LEXIS) (statements of Sen. Benjamin L. Cardin and Peter Brehm, Vice President of
Business Development and Government Relations, Infinia Corporation)
(interchangeably using the terms "future generations," "children," and
"grandchildren").
' Cf Daniel A. Farber & Paul A. Hemmersbaugh, The Shadow of the Future:
Discount Rates, Later Generationsand the Environment, 46 VAND. L. REV. 267, 291 (1993)
(assuming that most people believe there is a responsibility to consider the interests
of future generations).
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environment. Decades of concern about environmental damage have, of
course, caused some significant successes: once-polluted waterways have
again become capable of sustaining aquatic life, cars no longer spew lead
into the air, and recycling campaigns have steered tons of waste away
from landfills and back into the economic pipeline. To put these
successes in some recent historical perspective, we can at least say that no
river in the United States is likely to catch fire again anytime soon.
Clearly, however, there is much more that could be done.
Environmental damage continues to accumulate, with devastating effects
on human health, animal life, and entire ecosystems.5 We continue to use
energy sources that are devastating to the planet when they are extracted,
when they are burned, and when we dispose of their wastes. The
environmental effects of these human activities are sometimes obvious, as
when millions of gallons of oil gush into the Gulf of Mexico; but they are
often hidden, such as the slow death of coral reefs. Whether hidden or
obvious, however, we know that it takes time and effort to undo the
damage. Cleaning up after human activities is not cheap or easy, but it is
necessary.
Or is it? If we were willing and able to live with the consequences of
human economic activity, we would actually view it as wasteful and foolish
to expend serious efforts to undo what we have done. Few people, for
example, would plan to build houses to use during their lifetimes and
then dismantle the houses before they depart. We are apparently
comfortable believing that at least some of the profound changes that
come with our presence on the planet are unobjectionable. Not
everything must be undone. Not every landscape must be returned to its
condition before we arrived.
Decisions to reduce or undo human changes to the environment,
therefore, are not the default position. Lines must be drawn to
determine how much is too much, both aesthetically and in terms of
pollution's effects on human and other life. The lack of absolutes, in
turn, implies that difficult choices must be made to set limits on the
amounts and types of environmental changes that humans create.
Those choices would be difficult enough if everyone who would be
affected by those choices could be included in the decision-making

4 See, e.g., Four More PA Streams Added to EPA's List of Cleanup Success Stories, PR
NEwswIRE, Feb. 2, 2010, available at http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/fourmore-pa-streams-added-to-epas-list-of-cleanup-success-stories-83372647.html; National
ChallengeInspires U.S. Cities to Recycle Over 125 Million Aluminum Cans: "Cans for Cash"
Winners Announced at U.S. Conference of Mayors Winter Meeting, PR NEWSWIRE, Jan. 22,
2010, available at http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/national-challengeinspires-us-cities-to-recycle-over-125-million-aluminum-cans-82383932.html.
5 See, e.g., John M. Broder & Tom Zeller, Jr., Bad. But an Apocalypse?, N.Y. TIMES,
May 4, 2010, at Al (discussing the effects of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill).
6 See id.; see also Abdulsamad Haidari, Fighting to Save the Rainforests of the Ocean,
DAILY OUTLOOKAFG., Dec. 14, 2009, availableat 2009 WLNR 26336749.
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process.! If the political system were capable of processing and reflecting
a broad consensus on how much environmental damage people were
willing to accept, then the policy concerns could be reduced to how best
to meet the goals of that consensus, while ensuring that the concerns of
those who dissent from the consensus are fairly considered in the process
of making policy. This is never easy in practice, of course, but it is at least
a relatively uncontroversial approach to governance: create a political
system in which the interests of the affected parties can be reconciled,
and proceed from there to a political resolution and policy regime.
The fundamental difference in setting environmental policy, of
course, is the nagging problem that decisions today affect not just the
people currently involved in the political process but those who cannot
participate as well.8 Because there is no way to bring those future parties
into the process directly, the political process must somehow find a way
to represent their interests in juxtaposition to the interests of those who
are currently voting adults."
This does not mean, however, that current generations must elevate
the interests of future generations above all else. Taking into account the
interests of one party is clearly quite different from catering to its every
desire. Moreover, since there is no way even to know what those parties
would desire, at least for those who have not yet been born or reached
adulthood, responsible political decisions must ultimately be based on
two difficult steps: first, guessing what future generations would want us
to do, and second, balancing those likely wishes against the legitimate
interests of current generations.ro
This Essay addresses the question of generational justice with respect
to environmental issues, from the perspective of policy choices in the
United States. The analysis focuses first on the basic philosophical
question of what one generation owes any other generation or
generations. Concluding that the range of defensible choices available to
current generations is surprisingly broad-including doing nothing at all
to help future generations-it becomes important to know what future
generations of Americans would receive from current generations, both
economically and environmentally, if no policies were changed
henceforth. The issue then becomes whether environmental protection
should be purchased by trading off future material economic well-being,
especially given the very high material living standards that future

7
See RICHARD E. JusT, DARRELL L. HUETH & ANDREW SCHMITZ, THE WELFARE
ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC POLICY: A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO PROJECT AND POLICY

EVALUATION 579 (2004) (noting that future generations are necessarily left out of the
decision-making process).
8 See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Trouble with Time: Influencing the Conservation
Choices ofFuture Generations,44 NAT. RESOURCEsJ. 601, 602 (2004).
9 SeeJusT, HUETH & SCHMITZ, supra note 7, at 579.
10 See Farber & Hemmersbaugh, supra note 3, at 291.
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generations are very likely to inherit." The analysis then broadens to ask
whether there are policies that can help both current and future
generations. Happily, the answer to that question is a resounding "yes,"
meaning that the presumed conflict between generations is often more
theoretical than real. It is possible to make everyone better off, if policies
are chosen wisely-and so long as policy choices are made with special
attention to the effects of those policies on the most vulnerable people in
society.
The results of this analysis are thus clear and stark: If we are going to
bring future generations into existence, we will do so at the cost of
improving the lives of billions of currently living people. That choice
implies a moral commitment to making the lives of future generations
worth living. Future generations deserve a livable planet, first and
foremost. Moreover, nothing that has been proposed to date to mitigate
environmental harms would come close to making future generations
worse off-in the material terms commonly used to measure economic
2
well-being-than are today's generations of Americans. There is, in
other words, a broad range of win-win choices. Even if we are highly
aggressive about fighting environmental damage, we can still leave future
generations with both a better environment and a higher material
standard of living.
II. JUSTICE BETWEEN GENERATIONS
Every decision made by a government closes off other possibilities,
even as it sets in motion a new set of choices that will face future
policyrnakers. In the nineteenth century, such decisions as the Louisiana
Purchase, the Homestead Act, or all of the fateful choices that led to the
Civil War all affected notjust the people then living but every generation
to follow. In that fundamental way, all generations are the product of the
decisions of those who preceded them. At any moment, a choice can be
made in the belief that its consequences will not be so momentous as to
affect future generations significantly; but the distinction is a matter of
degree. We know that decisions today will change the future, even if we
do not yet know the form or extent of those effects.
The idea that each generation's decisions have long-term effects that
will continue long after that generation has passed on, therefore, is
hardly a novel or radical observation. Even so, the mere fact that
decisions today actually will affect future generations does not necessarily
mean that today's decisions should be altered in any way out of concern
for those possible future consequences. Knowing that we will change the

" See id. at 292.
1 See NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE STERN REvIEw

233-34 (2007).
1 See, e.g., Edith Brown Weiss, Our Rights and Obligations to Future Generationsfor
the Environment, 84 AM.J. INT'L L. 198, 200-01 (1990).
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future does not automatically mean that we must care about the changes
that our decisions might cause. Without a theory of moral obligation, no
person or group of people has any reason to care about the lives of
others. Why should today's decision makers-officeholders or voterschange what they do in recognition of future people's interests?
Surprisingly, this is a basic question with which philosophers have
struggled to find a satisfying answer. Ultimately, the case for caring about
future generations is much more difficult to sustain than many of us tend
to believe. 4
A. Do Current Generations Owe Anything to Future Generations?The
SurprisinglyDifficult Casefor IntergenerationalObligations
People living today know that there will be future generations of
people, so long as humans do not destroy themselves through war,
disease, or a universal decision to simply discontinue procreating. People
living today also know that their decisions to clear forests, to build roads,
to develop thinking computers, and every other economic and social
activity will change the world as time moves forward. How, if at all, should
our knowledge of those consequences change the decisions that we
make?
The most promising approach toward building a moral foundation
for intergenerational obligation is based on the simple concept of
avoiding harm to other living beings. 5 If we accept as a starting point that
people should not harm other people if such harm can reasonably be
avoided, then it seems a natural next step to point out that decisions
today might inflict harm on people tomorrow, next year, or in the next
century.
While it is a good start, that explanation ignores the variation in
moral obligations that people feel when they sense greater or lesser
connections with other people. Clearly, for example, many people who
would swerve in their cars to avoid hitting small children do not take
other (equally simple) actions that could reduce the incidence of
childhood deaths. This means that, even when considering the
consequences of one's decisions for people who are alive today, there are
degrees of moral connectedness that alter how people make harmavoiding decisions.
In the intergenerational context, the question of distance becomes
more extreme. It is one thing to talk about the interests of today's
children and grandchildren, but it is quite another to talk about the
interests of people who will be alive ten, twenty, or one hundred

" But see Farber & Hemmersbaugh, supranote 3, at 291 (stating that most people
"agree we have at least some responsibilities to consider and provide for the welfare
of future generations").
" See Anthony D'Amato, Do We Owe a Duty to Future Generations to Preserve the
Global Environment?, 84 AM.J. INT'L. L. 190, 193 (1990).
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generations from now. Perhaps the simplest way to bridge that moral gap
is through "intergenerational linkage," that is, that each generation cares
about its children (in some aggregate sense), and each generation will in
turn teach its children to care about their children. In that way, every
generation would care about the interests of all future generations.
As logically clever as that argument may be, however, it is still
possible that people might not feel as strongly about those indirect
connections to future eople, especially as the distance in time begins to
stretch into the future. Even knowing that a future person is one's greatgreat-great-great-grandchild, one might make a different decision than if
the affected party were one's own child. Because the consequences of
decisions become less certain as we look further into the future, it
becomes easier for people to justify short-term gains and long-term losses
when those long-term losses are not certain to occur.
It is not just the long-term consequences of today's actions that are
uncertain, however. Once we move past the lifetimes of people who have
already been born, the consequences of today's actions will be visited on
a group of people who not only are not known to us today, but who need
not be brought into existence at all. It is quite different to make a
decision that will prevent a person from ever coming into existence than
to end a life that already exists. Indeed, all decisions made today must, as
a matter of simple causality, change the identities of the people who will
actually exist in the future-because even small decisions today have a
ripple effect that will change whom people meet and marry, how many
children they will bear, and so on.
Making decisions today that will change who those people are and
the lives they will lead, therefore, is fundamentally different from
harming living people today. In an important sense, humans alive at any
particular time have no moral obligation to any particular unborn person
who might come into existence in the future, because each possible
future person has a vanishingly small chance of ever existing at all.
Because every decision at every moment in time can change the future
composition (including the size) of the human race, there is either no
morally cognizable harm in decisions that change the life prospects of
different potential future people, or any such harm is in a morally
different category. There is, again, an enormous difference between
ending a life today and making a decision that will prevent a life from
being lived 200 years from now.
In the extreme, this line of reasoning could suggest that the truly
superior moral choice would be to prevent future generations from even
coming into existence. This is certainly a counter-intuitive notion, but if
the choice is to help people today or to help people in the far-off future,
" See Farber & Hemmersbaugh, supra note 3, at 295 & n.107 ("Empirical studies
support this observation.").
" See id. at 295.

'8 See D'Amato, supra note 15, at 191.
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there is a very defensible moral case that we should favor the present over
the unknown and contingent future. It might, in short, be better if future
generations never came into existence.
1. Is the Future Too Grim to Allow FuturePeople to Come into Existence?
This is not, however, the familiar argument that life is nasty, brutish,
and short, making it immoral to bring future generations into existence,
dooming them to the inevitable miseries of life and death-miseries that
might only grow with time as the world spins out of control. Such a view
would purport to be a selfless one on the part of current generations,
seeming to take into account only the interests of those people who
would make up possible future generations, while ignoring the needs and
desires of today's adults. There is a genuine selflessness-even anguishin the conclusion that "I could not imagine bringing a child into a world
doomed to wars, terrorism, pollution, murder, and depravity." That
conclusion-that we should give up now and not allow people to be born
in the future, for their own good-could thus be described as a
regrettable but morally justifiable conclusion, based only on a grim
assessment of the lives that future human beings would inevitably lead.
Such a decision, however, would be based on the almost certainly
incorrect conclusion that there is nothing that we could do today to
provide the basis for a livable future for human beings beyond the next
few decades. It is true that things might become that bad, because human
activities in many areas are making it less likely that there will be a
hospitable environment within which to live fulfilling lives in the future.
As a matter of policy choice, however, it would be a profound abdication
of responsibility to summarily conclude that there is nothing that could
be done today to save the future, leaving us with no choice but to pull the
plug on hopes for a future for humanity. This attitude would, therefore,
be deeply selfish, because it would mean that people today would be
giving up on an extended future for humanity simply because they could
not figure out how to change the dangerous directions in which the
world is apparently headed.
There are, in other words, still policies that we could adopt today
that would allow humanity to survive well into the future; and if we do
not choose to adopt those policies, we would need a morally justified
reason for making that decision. That reason might be that we have tried
everything that we can think of to change the course of human events. At
this point, however, that simply seems not to be true as a statement of
human capacity. Progress on many fronts is halting and frustrating, and
progress is far too often reversed. To say that there is simply nothing
more that we could be doing, however, is almost certainly wrong.
2. Weighing the Interests of Current and FuturePeople
There is, however, a much stronger argument supporting the idea
that future generations should never come into existence. Rather than
being an abdication of responsibility for making choices to reduce
human misery, moreover, this argument would be based firmly on the
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idea that decisions today should minimize -people's pain and maximize
human fulfillment. Furthermore, it would be based on the idea that
people who are alive today have greater moral significance than the
infinite number of potential people who could exist in the multitude of
future paths that history could follow.
Imagine that it would be possible to make all people currently alive
today-everywhere in the world-live long, healthy, and fulfilling lives.
Achieving that happy outcome, however, would require economic
changes that would deplete the earth's resources and pollute the air and
water so profoundly that human life would cease to be possible on Earth
before the next turn of the century. To make the mental exercise simple,
imagine that the planet's capacity to support life could be managed in
such a way that it would be depleted just as the last person living today
drew her last breath. People could be told in advance that any child born
henceforth will die on that same day, leaving the moral choice to them as
to whether they would be willing to bear children doomed to such a fate;
or there could be a policy simply to ban all future reproduction. For
purposes of this mental exercise, what matters is that current generations
would decide to despoil the planet in the pursuit of mitigating human
suffering for those who are alive today.
It seems likely that most people would view such a policy decision as
immoral, because it would mean the inevitable end of humanity. The
moral calculus of such a decision, however, is surprisingly compelling
upon closer inspection. Rather than, as above, giving up on the future
because of a collective belief that nothing can be done, this approach
would say that it is better to prevent billions of currently living people
from dying of very preventable diseases, famines, and wars, than to bring
into existence future people to enjoy the lives that the vast bulk of today's
people will never enjoy. The very unselfish conclusion could well be that
it is better to make serious efforts to help real people who are suffering
today, even if that could mean that future people would never be born
(and, incidentally, never suffer or die).
There are, of course, reasonable objections to such a moral choice. It
is possible that the infinite future of human happiness, in some grand
utilitarian sense, would outweigh the misery of the billions of people
today who are surely doomed to painful, early deaths. Moreover, it could
be that there is no such thing as a "fulfilling" life for people who cannot
bear children, or who can only bear children knowing that they are
doomed to an early death. Knowing that humanity will continue, in other
words, could be an essential element of being human and of living a
happy life. In that case, the suffering of so many innocents today, while a
cause for sadness, would nevertheless be iustifiable in the name of
something larger than any person's suffering.9

'9

See generally Robert F. Woollard, Introduction:Fatal Consumption (When Too Much

Is Not Enough), in FATAL CONSUMPTION: RETHINKING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 3, 3-17
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This mental exercise is, -therefore, a useful lens through which to
view the implicit moral choices embodied in our current policies.
Current generations have already implicitly chosen not to favor currently
living human beings over hypothetical future ones. Although there has
never been a vote on the matter, it is clear that one or more governments
at any time in human history could have chosen the route described
above: to do everything possible to make the lives of today's people
bearable, even at the ultimate cost of preventing future people from ever
coming into being. Passively, therefore, humans to date have chosen to
elevate the interests of non-specific future humans over the interests of
large numbers of people who have already been born.20
However, describing this history as a choice, even a passive one,
might overstate the case. If people have never been given an explicit
choice, nor had an open civic debate about that choice, they might not
have ever considered it as a serious possibility. Moreover, a number of
other possible explanations are available to explain why no significant
group of humans has ever chosen to focus their resources exclusively on
their currently living members. It could be that each group believes that
it can simultaneously support both the living and the future-although
this would not hold up to the evidence of continuing famines, poverty,
and destitution. Coordination problems could also have prevented
people from acting on their putative desires, with each person thinking
that they would prefer the alternative, yet continuing to choose to have
more children because that is the most direct way available for them to
pass the blessings of happiness on to other humans.
However, given the universality of the choice that human societies
have made to pass up the support of large groups of the currently living
in a way that makes future generations possible, there is at least a strong
suggestion that large majorities of humans throughout history have
believed that providing for the unspecified future is an overriding goal of
society. This mental exercise, therefore, demonstrates that there is
ultimately a choice, and humans have chosen and continue to choosealbeit almost certainly without conscious deliberation-future people
over current people. People of every generation to date have thus shown
(at least indirectly) that they care about future generations, not just as an
abstract concept, but in a choice between present pain and future
happiness.

(Robert F. Woollard & Aleck S. Ostry eds., 2000) (stating that society must reduce its
consumption to become sustainable into the future).
2o

See, e.g., Farber & Hemmersbaugh, supranote 3, at 291.

2

See, e.g., GRUNDGESETZ FOR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ]

[GG] [BAsic LAw] May 23, 1949, BGBl. I, art. 20a (Ger.) ("Mindful also of its
responsibility toward future generations, the state shall protect the natural
foundations of life and animals by legislation and, in accordance with law and justice,
by executive and judicial action, all within the framework of the constitutional
order."); KoNsrYruqA RzEczYPosPoLrTEJ POLSKIEJ [CONsTrrtUON] Apr. 2, 1997, pmbl.
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Even if the philosophical theories that would support this choice are
surprisingly weak, therefore, there is little doubt that humans-at a core
22
level-care about guaranteeing the existence of future generations.
While there will inevitably be much disagreement over exactly what each
generation's obligations to future generations might include, there is at
least the tacit agreement that the core obligation is for each generation
to allow future generations to come into being. It remains troubling that
the moral case for such an obligation is relatively underdeveloped as a
theoretical matter; but ultimately, given such strong evidence of
agreement on the conclusion, the more useful inquiry might be to
develop the moral implications of having chosen the future over the
present.
B. How Much Is Enough?
If one can conclude, at least tentatively, that humans have shown
(through their actions) a belief that there should be future generations
of humanity, then it follows that current generations owe something to
the future generations that they will bring into existence. The next
important question is: How much? Do members of the current
generation have a moral duty to allow future generations to come into
existence in increasing sizes, with each generation increasing the overall
population of the planet? Do current generations owe future generations
a certain standard of living? Or a functioning economy? Is political
freedom, or a certain kind of political system, part of what must be left
for the benefit of future people?
As difficult as the basic question-whether any moral obligations
exist from one generation to those that might follow it-might be, the
"how much" question is even more difficult to answer. Philosophers have,
it is not an exaggeration to say, simply not been successful in describing a
moral theory by which one could describe the nature and (where
relevant) quantity of one generation's obligations to its heirs. In
economic terms, for example, there really is no agreed-upon moral
calculus that would allow a society to determine the material standard of
living that one generation must pass on to those that follow. In areas of
life that are less subject to quantification-the rule of law,
encouragement and preservation of the arts, and so on-the question of
degree is thus more difficult even to address, much less to answer.
In light of such a philosophical blank slate, a less-than-satisfying
alternative is simply to try to determine what people think about the
question, even if they have no firm sense of the moral basis for their

(Pol.) (stating that the nation was "[o]bliged to bequeath to future generations all
that is valuable from our over one thousand years' heritage").
2 See Matthew W. Wolfe, Note, The Shadows of Future Generations, 57 DuKE L.J.
1897, 1907 (2008).
" Id. at 1909.
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beliefs. Here, however, human history offers more ambiguity than in
addressing the question above-that is, whether there is an obligation to
make future life possible at all. Even so, the broadest area of agreement
seems to coalesce around an intuitive notion that people should make
sure that "my kids will do better than me." To be sure, this answer still
offers little quantitative guidance, but it does at least create a crude
baseline: Each generation should make sure that it leaves future
generations no worse off than current generations. As rough as the "no
worse off' standard might be, the analysis below will show that this
standard can be helpful in guiding environmental policy.
C.

The UniqueIntergenerationalObligationsRaised by EnvironmentalDamage

The nature of decision-making necessarily involves making choices
that are, in a fundamental sense, irreversible. The choice to, say, build a
shopping mall on a site that could have become a new housing
development can be reversed in the sense that, after the mall is built, it
can be torn down and replaced later with houses-or, for that matter,
with a school, a nuclear power plant, or a cemetery. Yet that reversal of a
previous policy does not change history. The workers who built the mall
were unavailable to build other projects at that time; the land was used
for a mall to the exclusion of other uses; and the process of later
destroying the mall also involved the use of human and economic
resources. Even though it is possible to rid ourselves of the mall,
therefore, carrying out the initial decision to build it changed history in
an irreversible way.
Although all decisions are thus irreversible in this logical sense, the
nature of environmental change can be irreversible in a much more
profound sense. It is possible to rebuild a mountaintop that was
destroyed by the coal mining industry-though only at great cost and
very imperfectly, with many lives lost throughout the process. It is not,
however, possible to bring an animal or plant species back from
extinction. Even the highly imperfect kind of reversibility that is possible
in many other contexts, therefore, is clearly not possible in the case of
many environmental changes.
The most threatening of such irreversible possible environmental
harms, of course, is global warming. If the worst predictions of
climatologists were to come true, with the melting of ice caps leading to
See id. at 1908 (quoting Edith Brown Weiss, The Planetary Trust: Conservation and
Intergenerational Equity, 11 ECOLOGY L.Q. 495, 498-99 (1984)). Professor Weiss
develops the planetary trust concept further in her book IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE
24

GENERATIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAw, COMMON PATRIMONY, AND INTERGENERATIONAL
EQUnTY (1989).

See generally Michael E. Mann, Do Global Warming and Climate Change Represent a
2
Serious Threat to Our Welfare and Environment?, 26 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 193 (2009)
(discussing the scientific background for global warming and the implications for
society and the environment).
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rising sea levels sufficient to submerge large and populated areas near
the oceans," there is nothing in the capacity of human technology that
would allow humans to undo their previous catastrophic choices. Even if
it were somehow possible to lower the temperature of the planet, and to
take on the impossible task of rebuilding the ice caps, the climate
changes that would accompany the initial warming-extreme weather
disasters, droughts, and so on-would themselves wreak irreversible
changes on all forms of life.
Even short of the most extreme consequences of global warming,
moreover, the costs of undoing environmental damage will often (if not
almost universally) be higher than the costs of avoiding the damage in
the first place. The remediation efforts necessary to remove cancercausing pollutants from the Hudson River have already exceeded a half
billion dollars," with the "far more expansive",8 second phase of the
cleanup expected to cost hundreds of millions more29-and even those
efforts are halting and incomplete after decades of very expensive
litigation." More than 20 years after the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska,
the environmental damage has not been fully remediated.3 The costs
and consequences of the BP oil spill in 2010 in the Gulf of Mexico are
32
still too vast and uncertain to measure. Whatever those costs ultimately
are, it is a safe prediction that much of the damage will never be undone.
In this way, even though environmental damage and economic
damage are both irreversible in a strict sense, they are not the same kind
of damage. Even during economic prosperity, there is generally a bit of
slack in the productive capacity of an economy, since many workers do
not work overtime, and factories are not all running as continuously as
they might. Therefore, a temporary reduction in a nation's gross
26 See Tom Gardner, Scientist: Global Warming
Could Melt Ice Caps, Eliminate Half of
Earth's Species, USA TODAY, Jan. 11, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/weather
/climate/2007-01-11-hansen-warming.x.htm (warning that, as an example of the type
of damage that could occur in a plausible climate change scenario, parts of Florida
and Georgia would become submerged by rising ocean levels).
27 Michael Hill, Hudson River PCB Cleanup Has Cost $561M So Far, GE Says, DAILY
FREEMAN, Apr. 30, 2010, http://www.dailyfreeman.com/articles/2010/04/30/news
/doc4bdb595da4f~c673736077.txt (reporting GE's estimate of $561 million as its cost
of Phase One of the Hudson River dredging project to clean up "PCBs, or
polychlorinated biphenyls, [which] are considered probable carcinogens").
28 Id.
2 See id. ("There were outside estimates that both phases of the project could
cost $500 million when the EPA called for the cleanup in 2002, though more recent
estimates put the total cost at over $700 million.").
" See Editorial, G.E.'s Latest Maneuver, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2010, at A18, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/02/opinion/02sat3.html.
" See S. Brady Calhoun, Gulf Oil Spill: Lingering Disaster?, NEWS HERALD, Oct. 3,
2010, available at http://www.newsherald.com/articles/lingering-87436-long-oil.html.
2 See Ian Walker, BP PledgesAssets as Gulf Spill Collateral,WALL ST.J., Oct. 1, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB0001424052748703859204575525482920628758.html
(estimating the costs to be $11.2 billion).
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domestic product can be reversed later, in a way that leaves future
generations unaffected, because the economy that is bequeathed to
future generations can have the same level of income and the same
amount of technology and productive capital as it would have had
without the temporary change. As a policy matter, it is not always the case
that a society would want to undo that type of economic damage,
depending on other priorities; but the point is that it is possible. Many
environmental harms are different from economic harms, therefore,
because they are irreversible in a deeper sense than the simple
irreversibility of time.
Finally, there is a category of ultimate irreversibility. If we are willing,
as we apparently are, to allow pain and suffering to be visited upon so
many of those who are currently alive, in the name of future generations,
then our most important moral obligations have to do with existential
threats to future generations. The greatest responsibility that one
generation takes on is thus to allow future generations to exist. This puts
not just global warming, but issues surrounding both nuclear power and
nuclear weapons-both of which carry the potential to make the Earth
uninhabitable-on a different moral plane from the possible harms of
human activity that fall short of making life impossible. Not all
environmental harms are of such a high order, of course, but
environmental dama es figure prominently on the list of existential
threats to human life.
Therefore, even though it is surprisingly difficult to build a case for
one generation's obligations to another, it is possible to observe that
humans systematically act in ways that suggest that people have accepted
a sense of intergenerational duty. The possible responses to this are to
argue that people might want to change those attitudes and actions in
ways that could mitigate massive human suffering in the here and now, or
to accept the moral choices implied by those underlying attitudes and
draw out the implications of taking those moral choices seriously. If, in
other words, we are not willing to destroy the environment for the
morally defensible reason that doing so could help billions of vulnerable
people who are suffering today, then we should make sure that the
decisions we are making to guarantee the possibility of future life are
logically coherent. In the hierarchy of harms to avoid, environmental
damages-especially those on a large scale-thus hold a special moral
primacy over other interests.

3 See generally Samuel S. Myers & Jonathan A. Patz, Emerging Threats to Human
Healthfrom Global Environmental Change, 34 ANN. REV. ENV'T & RESOURcES 223 (2009)
(discussing how environmental changes are producing significant vulnerabilities for
segments of the human population).
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III. TRADE-OFFS BETWEEN THE ECONOMY AND THE
ENVIRONMENT
The debate over global warming has generally been waged over the
scientific issues: whether the climate is changing and whether any such
change has been caused-in whole or in significant part-by humans.
With a clear scientific consensus that the answer to both of those
questions is "yes,"S4 further technical questions follow: How much
damage will the changing climate do to the planet and to the living
standards of its inhabitants (human and non-human)? Will the planet
become unlivable? Have we already passed the point of no return, such
that the coming damage, while regrettable, can no longer be prevented
(although it can be anticipated, allowing people to prepare
appropriately)? If it is still possible to stop the worst effects, how much
damage can be avoided, and through what means?
As the debate turns toward questions of mitigation strategies, the
questions that had seemed to be about climate science and engineering
have become more obviously questions involving a heavy dose of
economics. 3 5 Once we have concluded that the climate is changing, no
matter the reason and no matter how irreversible, all of the questions
become explicitly about costs and benefits. If the climate will inevitably
change our lifestyles, what can we do to adapt (either permanently, or as
we await an inevitable time when life dies out entirely)? Must entire
populations be relocated, leaving whole regions abandoned by humans,
or can existing populations respond to climate change where they are? If
the climate can be prevented from changing, must we undo some of the
damage already done, or can we satisfy ourselves simply with doing no
further damage?
Making such choices involves comparing costs and benefits; and
while climate scientists and engineers can tell us what is possible, oldfashioned economic analysis can usefully be applied to difficult choices
among the various options available. There is no intrinsically right answer
to any question involving choices. Even if, for example, we knew that we
could undo all of the damage inflicted by man thus far on the planet's
ecology, doing so might be so expensive that we would be better off
mitigating the harms rather than reversing them, or only undoing some
of the damage rather than all of it." Or the opposite could be true, which
would require an all-out effort to undo humanity's massive impact on the

m See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE

SYNTHESIs REPORT, 36-37

(Core Writing Team, Rajendra K. Pachauri

2007:

& Andy

Reisinger eds., 2008), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr
/ar4 syr.pdf.
See, e.g., Farber & Hemmersbaugh, supranote 3, at 300-02.
' See Neil H. Buchanan, Oil Spills, Mine Disasters, and Everyday Environmental
Degradation: The Suddenly Unhidden Costs of Our Standard of Living, FINDLAw (May 6,
2010), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/buchanan/20100506.html.
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planet thus far. There is, in short, no presumptively correct choice, even
if one of the choices is a return to a pastoral world with no human
footprint.
A.

Environmental Options and Economic Choices

The fundamental economic problem of comparing costs and
benefits is, however, immeasurably more difficult in the area of
environmental harm, especially climate change. Because climate change,
as well as any efforts to undo or mitigate climate change, takes place over
the space of decades or centuries, the weighing of costs and benefits
involves not just the current generation's assessments of those
It also necessitates our making guesses about how
magnitudes.
generations yet unborn would weigh those costs and benefits. If, as
discussed above, current generations have decided that it is morally
imperative to allow future generations to come into existence, then it is
likely that current generations would also want to allow those future
generations to enjoy that existence. Even if that sense of obligation is
weak or nonexistent, moreover, it is helpful to think about whether there
are choices available today that could benefit current generations without
changing the prospects of their children's children, or that could benefit
future generations by making a trade-off that is of no import to current
generations.
The global warming debate, therefore, involves not just climate
science and economics, but moral philosophy as well." We cannot make
any decisions with long-lasting effects without asking a fundamental-yet
ultimately unanswerable-question: What would future generations want
us to do? The desires of future generations should not prevent current
generations from taking their own desires into account, but any analysis
is incomplete without a conscious assessment of how any policy choices
would be viewed by every affected party, living and not yet living.
Deciding how to improve the lives of future generations is, however,
not a simple matter of making the choices that current generations
would make for themselves. If current generations, for example, yearn
for a return to a more natural lifestyle-regretting the centuries of
human decisions that have resulted in dirty air, disease-laden waters, and
despoiled landscapes-they might conclude that future people would be
grateful for decisions made today that would make a return to a more
natural lifestyle possible. This would result in policy choices designed to

" See Jeff L. Lewin, Which ExternalitiesShould We Internalize? Comment on The Role
of Law in Defining Sustainable Development: NEPA Reconsidered by Professor David
Hodas, 3 WIDENER L. SyMp. J. 327, 340-42 (1998) (discussing costs to current
generations of internalizing environmental externalities and costs to future
generations of not internalizing environmental externalities).
" See Farber & Hemmersbaugh, supra note 3, at 270 ("The discounting issue
combines technical economics with philosophical conundrums.").
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give future people something that has been lost, most likely at a cost to
current generations.
It is possible, however, that future generations would-if their
opinions could be known in advance-tell us not to bother. At various
times and places, the height of human advancement was considered to
be the ability to rise above the natural environment." There is, at least,
no obvious reason why being closer to the earth is something that future
generations would value.
Consider a very stark example: Suppose that there were a direct
choice between providing consumer goods for future generations and
giving them a breathable atmosphere that can sustain life. If it could be
possible to provide breathable air through artificial means, such as gas
masks, this would mean that there is a choice between creating a world
where future generations can breathe naturally but lack certain
consumer goods, or allowing a future world to come into existence in
which people breathe artificially but have a much wider array of goods
for their amusement. How would we know whether future generations
would really want to trade their toys for the ability to breathe air the oldfashioned way? In fact, it is easy to imagine human attitudes adapting
quite readily to a world that is so radically different from ours, with gas
masks becoming a fashion item, sun-block creams being used for
cosmetic purposes, and so on.
Even so, because it is not possible to ask future generations what they
would prefer, current generations must speak for them. Ultimately, that
is what the policy-making process is all about. Moreover, because of the
problem of irreversibility noted above, any decision to take away
environmental options must be weighed more seriously than decisions
that can be changed at any point in the future with relative ease.4 It
seems at least plausible, therefore, that any decision based on a guess
about what future generations might want should take into account how
well that decision preserves the options of future generations. Absent a
compelling reason, future generations should not be prevented from
being able to choose even greener options, should it turn out that they
value nature more highly than consumer goods.
In any event, the actual issues over which policy debates are currently
being waged probably do not involve such stark choices. The best
evidence available suggests that we could make decisions today to
" See David G. Guest, "This Time For Sure" - A Politicaland Legal History of Water
Control Projects in Lake Okeechobee and the Everglades, 13 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 645, 645-46
(2001) (discussing Florida's shortcomings in its attempts to control the environment
through dredging and filling the Everglades throughout the nineteenth century).
4
See Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic, 91 CORNELL L. REv. 841, 845
(2006) (discussing how irreversibility and catastrophe inform discussions on how to
deal with safety, health, and environmental risks, and noting that "[w]hen regulators
lack information about the likelihood and magnitude of a risk, it makes sense to
spend extra resources to buy an 'option' to protect against irreversible harm until
future knowledge emerges" (emphasis omitted)).
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improve the environmental inheritance of future generations without
lowering their material living standards. Indeed, many of the choices
available today could both save the environment and help improve future
material living standards. Therefore, while it is reasonable to worry about
the possibility of extreme trade-offs, the actual range of policy choices
allows for dramatic improvements in future environmental outcomes,
while still allowing people's economic incomes to rise substantially.
B. MaterialLiving Standards and Human Happiness

The United States has been the global economic leader since the
middle of the last century. Coming out of the Great Depression and
World War II, the United States resumed the path of increasing living
standards that had begun with the Industrial Revolution in the latter half
of the 1800s. Living standards in the United States, as measured by
inflation-adjusted gross domestic product per person (real GDP per
capita), has risen impressively for decades.4 1 This has occurred while the
42
population has more than doubled.
Even so, the United States does not have the highest living standard
in the world, even using the most conventional measures of economic
43
well-being. Moreover, the distribution of the rewards of the economy
has become much less equal in the United States during the last few
decades than in many countries with similar levels of national wealth.
We cannot say that living in this country provides a standard of material
existence that is in any sense comfortable for a surprisingly large slice of
the population. With poverty rates stubbornly high, especially among
children, one cannot blithely assume that living in a rich country
automatically means living well.
There are, in addition, well-known concerns about using gross
domestic product as a measurement of human economic well-being.
Even basic economics textbooks note that GDP ignores some of the most

EcoNs.,
TRADING
PER
CAPITA,
GDP
STATES
UNITED
41 See
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/Economics/GDP-Per-Capita.aspx?Symbol=USD
(showing the increase in GDP per capita over the last several decades).
4
See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, POL/02-MA(RV),
MEASURING AMERICA: THE DECENNIAL CENSUS FROM 1790 To 2000, at app. A-1 (2002),
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/pol02marv.pdf (showing the
results of each census from 1790 through 2000).
1 See UNITED NATIONS DEv. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2010, THE
REAL WEALTH OF NATIONS: PATHWAYS TO HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 143 tbl.1 (2010),
availableat http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR 2010ENCompletereprint.pdf.
" See James B. Davies et al., The World Distribution of Household Wealth 4 tbl.1
(United Nations Univ., Discussion Paper No. 2008/03, 2008); Timothy Noah,
Inequality Petard,SLATE (Sept. 28, 2010), http://www.slate.com/id/2268981/.
4 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, P60-238, INCOME, POVERTY,
AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2009, at 14 (2009).
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important elements of human life that people might value. 4 The two
most important of those are the ability not to work, and the quality of the
natural environment within which one lives. Other problems include
the difficulty in measuring economic outputs accurately or consistently
(such as the problem of comparing the value of an owner-occupied
home to a rental apartment), and such oddities as the GDP rising after
natural disasters (because efforts to rebuild damaged communities are
measured in GDP, while the destruction itself is omitted from such

measurements).
One possible response to this profound measurement issue is to
broaden the measuring tool to take account of the various shortcomings
that have been identified. Including the value of leisure, or subtracting
the value of ecological harms, might improve the measure of economic
income such that it would be more meaningful to people when the
government announces that their incomes have risen or fallen.
Any such changes, however, will of necessity be imperfect; and,
especially for matters relating to the environment, the difficulty in
putting an economic value on various items to be included in an
advanced GDP measure would be daunting, to say the least. Changing
the measurement, therefore, does not really change the underlying
problem of comparing economic goods with environmental harms. As
valuable as it might be to try to improve GDP as a measure of well-being,
doing so merely relocates any possible trade-off between economic
outcomes and environmental outcomes into the standard of
measurement itself. Continuing to use GDP as a measure of material
economic well-being (conceding that it is flawed even for that more
limited task), by contrast, permits the analysis to highlight any such tradeoffs.
Gross Domestic Product should not, therefore, be thought of as a
synonym for "human happiness." On the other hand, it is not too far off
to describe it as measuring material economic well-being, and as
measuring the changes in material economic well-being that might be
implied by environmentally motivated changes in policy. The important
issue is not, in other words, to perfect the yardstick. It is to use the
existing yardstick to measure what it currently measures, in contrast to
what it does not.

' See, e.g., IRVIN B. TUCKER 111, SURVEY OF ECONOMICs 202 (1995) (noting that GDP
"perpetuates the false dichotomy between economic growth and environmental
protection").
7 See Eric Zencey, Op-Ed., G.D.P. RIP., N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 10, 2009, at A17
(noting that unpaid domestic work and nature have value that is not included in the
GDP).
' See id.; see also What's Wrong with the GDP as a Measure of Progress?,PDFCAST.ORG
(Feb. 6, 2010), http://pdfcast.org/pdf/what-s-wrong-with-the-gdp-as-a-measure-ofprogress.
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C. ProjectionsofMaterialLiving Standards in the Future
As noted above, the United States is-as measured by real (that is,
inflation-adjusted) GDP per capita-among the richest countries in the
world. To analyze the implications of policy choices for future
generations, however, one important question is not the size of GDP
today but its size in the future. If the economy is likely to provide a
higher material standard of living in the future under the current policy
regime, then a policy change that would decrease future GDP could still
leave future generations with higher incomes than current generations
enjoy.49 That would not automatically justify a policy to reduce future
GDP, of course, but it could change the moral calculus of doing so.
Each year, several federal agencies in the United States issue reports
forecasting living standards going forward for several decades.o Because
the Social Security system is inherently an intergenerational policy
regime, it has become the custom for the Trustees of the Social Security
system to issue annual reports forecasting the likely changes in various
economic variables that are relevant not only to Social Security's internal
financial prospects but-of central import to the current discussion-to
assessing the likely economic prospects that will be inherited by younger
generations as they move through their lifespans.
The Trustees' annual reports have become an authoritative source
for forecasts of the path of the economy on a 75-year horizon. Although
the Trustees do not provide forecasts that specifically show the change in
real GDP per capita over that horizon, the annual reports do provide all
of the data necessary to generate such forecasts. The annual reports,
moreover, provide three scenarios for future economic outcomes, based
on different assumptions about the path of key economic and
demographic variables over time. For reasons specific to the Social
Security program, even the most optimistic of those forecast scenarios is
actually relatively pessimistic-or, at least, it is not based on economic
assumptions that are notably different from the performance of the U.S.
economy over the past 50 years or so.
Using those forecasting scenarios to predict the levels of income that
might be enjoyed by the youngest of the currently living generations, as
well as their children and grandchildren, it turns out that the long-term
economic future facing this country is extremely robust. Even relatively
small increases in living standards every year compound over time to

" See Neil H. Buchanan, Social Security is Fair to Future Generations (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the author).
5 See, e.g., BoARD OF TRUSTEES, FED. OLD-AGE & SURVIVORS INS. & FED. DISABILITY
INS. TRUST FUNDS, THE 2010 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE
FEDERAL OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS INSURANCE AND FEDERAL DISABILIlY INSURANCE TRUST

FUNDS, H.R. Doc. No. 111-137, at 103 (2010), available at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT
/TR/2010/tr2010.pdf (explaining that "[flor the low-cost assumptions, annual
growth in real GDP is projected to average 3.5 percent over the decade ending in
2019").
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raise material living standards far above the levels enjoyed by most
Americans today. Specifically, the least pessimistic scenario shows that
real GDP per capita in 2085 would be more than four times higher than in
2009.5 The more conservative assumptions in the "intermediate
scenario" imply per-person living standards more than three times higher
than today's levels. Finally, the most pessimistic scenario, under which
the economy would grow more sluggishly over the next 75 years than it
has over any ten-year span in modem U.S. economic history, still implies
material living standards that are significantly more than twice the level of
53
today's real GDP per capita.
Naturally, any such long-term forecasts must be viewed skeptically.
Even the most short-term economic forecasts have been regularly shown
to be wildly off the mark. Nevertheless, there are a number of reasons to
take these long-term forecasts seriously. First, as noted, the statisticians
who generated the underlying economic assumptions provide more than
one forecast scenario, and they erred quite deliberately on the side of
pessimism in the assumptions that went into each scenario. That makes
these forecasts much more than a simple best-guess estimate of, say, a
stock index's performance over the course of a year.
Second, the variables on which these forecasts ultimately rely do not
show great variability over time. Demographic trends are relatively stable
and predictable, especially birth and death rates over rather long time
spans;5 5 and although net immigration can be more volatile, it is also
much more responsive to policy changes. Moreover, long-term economic
growth is ultimately based on likely increases in the productivity of future
workers, which is in turn dependent on investments in education,
business equipment, and technology. Even with occasional declines in
the annual levels of those investments, this country has consistently
invested-through both public and private entities-at sufficient levels to
support continued increases in the productive abilities of future
workers.56 Failing to continue to do so would, of course, have profound
implications for intergenerational equity, but there is every reason to
Author's calculations, using data available from id. at 193.
Author's calculations, using data available from id. at 192.
" Author's calculations, using data available from id.
* Charles P. Blahous III, Have the Social Security Trustees Been Too
Conservative?, at 2-3 (Presentation to the American Enterprise Institute, Sept. 7,
http://www.aei.org/docLib/20070910_BlahousExtendedRemarks.pdf
2007),
(discussing the Trustees' calculations and noting that "[s]ome previous Trustees'
reports have indeed erred on the side of excess conservatism").
" Jagadeesh Gokhale & Kent Smetters, GapingEntitlement Imbalance, WASH. TIMES,
Mar. 28, 2004, at B3 (noting that "the problems facing Social Security and Medicare
are driven by relatively stable and predictable long-term demographic trends").
56 Those investments lead to increased productivity by workers, which leads to
the increased living standards summarized in, for example, the Trading Economics
chart referenced earlier. See TRADING EcoNS., supra note 41 (showing the increase in
GDP per capita over the last several decades). Without higher productivity, those
increased levels of GDP would not have been possible.
'

5
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believe that the country's commitment to investing in future productivity
will not be reduced significantly over the long term. If it is, it will be the
result of explicit policy choices, not because the economy cannot
generate higher future living standards.
Third, the Social Security Trustees' forecasts of much higher living
standards have been highly stable over time. 7 That is, the annual reports
prior to the Great Recession (from which the United States is currently
emerging) provided forecasts implying the same range of future living
standards-more than quadrupling, more than tripling, or more than
doubling-as in the reports that have been issued in the two years since
the recession began. If the largest economic downturn in the United
States since the 1930s does not change the fundamentals of long-term
growth, then there is reason to feel reasonably confident that such
growth is resilient to unfavorable trends.
Finally, the sheer size of the predicted increase in real GDP per
capita suggests that the future changes will be large and positive." While
time will tell whether the forecasts turn out to be accurate, it would take a
very substantial change in the assumptions underlying the forecasts to
make them pessimistic enough to make the future changes shrink
substantially, and larger changes still to make them disappear entirely.
As noted, however, these forecasts are averages for the entire
economy-an economy that has changed over the last generation to
become much less equal in the distribution of its economic rewards.
While it is safe to say that taking, say, 20% of income away from people
living in 2085 would still leave the average person at that time
substantially better off economically than the average person living today,
it is possible that the costs will be borne by future people who are on the
bottom end of the income spectrum-an income spectrum that, while
higher on average, could still (if we do nothing about income
distribution trends between now and then) have a low end that is
anything but wealthy, or even comfortable.
The good news, therefore, is that there is a great deal of room to
enact policies that could reduce future real GDP per capita below the
elevated rates that would otherwise be created, yet still leave future
people on average much richer than the average person is today. That is
good news indeed. The bad news is that poorly designed policies could
still lead to the costs being visited on those who are least able to afford
them. This requires policymakers to be careful not just about how their
" CHAD STONE & ROBERT GREENSTEIN, CENTER ON BUDGET & POL'Y PRIORITIES,
WHAT THE 2008 TRUSTEES' REPORT SHows ABOUT SOCIAL SECURITY 4 (2008), availableat

http://www.cbpp.org/files/-27-08socsec.pdf (noting that "the outlook for Social
Security has been relatively stable").
See BOARD OF TRUSTEES, FED. OLD-AGE & SURVIVORS INS. & FED. DISABILITY INS.
TRUST FUNDS, THE 2010 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL
OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS INSURANCE AND FEDERAL DISABILIY INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS,
H.R. Doc. No. 111-137, at 103 (2010), available at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT

/TR/2010/tr2010.pdf (projecting a 3% increase in GDP over ten years).
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policy choices might affect future incomes, but how those changes might
affect people of different incomes. In short, intergenerational justice is
not just a matter of looking at the changes in income between
generations. It is also tied up very directly with distributive justice.
IV. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES
The standard assumption in nearly all debates about environmental
policy is that being cleaner is more expensive than being dirty. Leaving
behind a mess is easier and cheaper than cleaning it up. Therefore, the
problem of environmental protection and remediation can be cast as a
classic trade-off between economic growth and ecological protection. If
this is true, then the moral choice underlying any pro-environmental
legislation involves balancing lost economic income against the
improvement in the health of the planet.
The unspoken assumption underlying claims by those who oppose
policies to save the environment is that the trade-off is a simple one:
higher incomes come at the cost of a poorer environment, whereas a
better environment must make people economically poorer. This
assumption, however, is not only contestable regarding whether there is
truly a trade-off between pro-environmental laws and income, but it is
also completely lacking in context. If "lower income" really means
"income that is much higher than today, but a bit lower than it might
have otherwise been," then that can lead to a very different conclusion
about the choices that living generations should make about policies that
might affect their children and grandchildren.
A.

Trading Off the Economy and the Environment

Opponents of bills that would address climate change proposed in
the United States Congress often deride those bills as "job killers."60
Viewed narrowly, this attack is utterly irrelevant to intergenerational
justice in environmental policy. Viewed broadly, however, the attack
simply misstates the stakes in the environmental policy debate.
From a narrow standpoint, if pro-environmental policies were to
cause some firms to lay off workers, this would be purely an
intragenerational effect. That is, nearly all economists agree that, over
the long run, the number ofjobs in an economy will return to something
approximating full employment. Or, to put the point more precisely,
economists assume that any workers who are laid off due to any
" See Lawrence B. Solum, To Our Children's Children's Children: The Problems of
Intergenerational Ethics, 35 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 163, 176-201 (2001) (discussing
intergenerational and distributive justice).
' See, e.g., Phil Kerpen, Cap-and-TradeEnergy Tax: job-Killer with No Environmental
2009),
(July
30,
BLOG
TEX.
PROSPERITY
FOR
AMS.
Benefit,
http://www.americansforprosperity.org/072909-cap-and-trade-energy-tax-job-killerno-environmental-benefit#ixzzl3ccUIAy3.
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particular policy in the short run will be able to find alternative work
within (at worst) a few years, allowing the unemployment rate to return
to a low, steady level after recovering from a recession or other
temporary disruption. People who lose their jobs in a buggy whip
factory eventually become employed in an automobile factory, and their
children work in automobile factories before being forced to find jobs in
high-technology industries. The transition can be wrenching, of course,
but as a matter of intergenerational justice, it is beside the point that a
particular policy causes people to move from one sector of the economy
into others. Moreover, the entire notion of "green jobs" is based on the
fact that people who have been forced out of jobs in environmentally
damaging industries can be trained for work in the new industries that
will come into being in response to changed environmental policies. In
the short run, therefore, the attack on environmental protection
policies-that they supposedly destroy jobs-is only as serious as our
inability to put people back to work quickly, and to assist in their
transition where necessary.
If, on the other hand, "job killer" is merely a colorful way of saying
that a policy might decrease future incomes-in other words, everyone
who wants to work can find a job, but the average job pays less than it
otherwise would-then the broader question is whether decreasing
future incomes is always a bad thing. Stating that there is a cost to doing
something, after all, cannot be the end of the debate, not until we know
both how difficult it is to bear that cost and the benefits that will flow
from bearing the cost. The question is not whether there are costs per se,
but whether those costs should be borne for a larger purpose.
The analysis above demonstrated that future generations will, on
average, enjoy much higher incomes than people enjoy today. Enacting a
policy change that reduces those incomes is, therefore, quite different
from enacting a policy that would cause future incomes to be lower than
today's incomes. The point is that our best estimates of the future path of
incomes suggest a win-win outcome, not in the sense that proenvironmental policies actually increase living standards (although they
can), but in the sense that those policies can reduce incomes from the

6' See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUB. No. 4156, THE BUDGET AND EcoNOMic
OUTLOOIc AN UPDATE, at xv (2010), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs
/I17xx/doc1705/08-18-Update.pdf (describing the forecast for the U.S. economy as
it recovers from the Great Recession, assuming that the economy will return to its
potential growth path, and concluding that "[b]eyond 2014, CBO projects, growth in
real GDP will match the growth of potential GDP at 2.4 percent. In the agency's
projections, the unemployment rate averages 5.0 percent from 2015 through 2020").
An unemployment rate of 5% would represent a return to the levels seen in the
prosperous economic times prior to the current downturn.
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elevated levels that the economy is likely to provide, leaving future
incomes higher as a net measure.
The opponents of legislation to address environmental harms,
therefore, must take into account the context within which any costs of
that legislation will play out. The best estimates to date imply, in fact, that
the cost of even the most comprehensive legislation in the United States
to address climate change would reduce incomes by a tiny amount. For
example, a nonpartisan government agency analyzed the cap-and-trade
provisions in the recently defeated energy bill in Congress, concluding
that those provisions would reduce GDP from its otherwise-elevated level
by between 1% and 3.5% by 2050-against real GDP that will be
63
approximately 2.5 times higher than today's GDP. This means that
assuming average income, which is close to $50,000 today, would be
either $125,000 without the cap-and-trade regime, or between $120,625
and $123,750 with the regime.
Given the extremely small costs of one of the biggest proposals to
date to fight global warming, therefore, the trade-offs implied by a variety
of strategies-even enacted cumulatively-are very favorable. This means
that, even if we were to adopt a highly aggressive regime to fight global
warming, future generations would not only enjoy the benefits of a better
environment, but they would still earn, on average, much higher incomes
than people earn today.
As discussed above, moreover, even if there were no increases in
future income, one could nonetheless easily imagine an ethical basis for
deciding (however reluctantly) that future people should have lower
economic living standards than those that exist today, in order to enjoy
higher environmental living standards. The promising outlook for future
incomes does not fundamentally change the nature of the trade-offs, but
it certainly makes it possible to be less worried about policies that might
trim a bit off the high incomes that will otherwise be available to future
citizens.
This is not, however, a statement that all policies that might help the
future environment can safely be viewed as helping future generations at
an acceptable cost. Each policy must, of course, provide valuable benefits
to future generations tojustify the costs. Even so, the broad numbers are
so favorable that it is a violation of the interests of future generations to
" See Neil H. Buchanan, Wat Do We Owe Future Generations?, 77 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 1237, 1287 (2009) (concluding that future generations will enjoy higher
standards of living than current generations).
63 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUB. No. 4001, THE EcoNOMIc EFFECTS OF LEGISLATION
TO REDUCE GREENHOUSE-GAs EMISSIoNS 2 (2009),

available at http://www.cbo.gov

see also Ian W.H. Parry &
/ftpdocs/105xx/docl0573/09-17-Greenhouse-Gas.pdf;
William A. Pizer, CombatingGlobal Warming, REGULATION, Fall 2007, at 18, 21, available
at http://cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv30n3/v3n3-4.pdf ("While there has been
some controversy on this issue, the most recent research suggests that the overall
costs of imposing a CO, tax of around $5 to $15 per ton ... are small and perhaps
even negative.").
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simply assume that they would always favor ever-higher incomes over the
modest costs of significant environmental legislation.
For environmental legislation that is addressed to existential threats,
moreover, the presumed trade-offs are even more meaningful. Even if it
were necessary to reduce economic incomes by, say, 50% from today's
levels (not from their much higher future levels) over the next 50 years
in order to prevent the planet from becoming uninhabitable, it would be
necessary to do so. If we do not at least take the steps necessary to
guarantee the inhabitability of the planet for future generations, then
there is no reason to pretend that we are doing them a favor by
preventing their incomes from falling.
B. A World Without Trade-offs?
Not all policies to prevent environmental damage, however, require
trade-offs in material living standards. 4 In a slightly different sense of the
term "win-win," it is possible to engage in policies that both improve the
environment and increase future living standards. This is not, however, a
free lunch, because there is a cost. But it is borne by current generations,
not future generations. Current generations can reduce their own
consumption by moving economic resources into investments in future
clean industries, which will raise real GDP per capita while reducing
environmental harm.
In fact, some of the very best pro-environmental strategies also have
large payoffs in terms of future incomes. Investments in low-electricity
appliances and low-energy transportation are likely to generate extremely
high rates of return.66 Countries with modern, high-speed rail systems, for
example, can move people and goods at much lower costs and with much
less environmental damage than in the United States, which continues to
67
rely on a uniquely car-and-road-intensive approach to transportation.
Interestingly, even investments in improved roadways provide rates of
return that allow them to pay for themselves, even if they are financed by

" See Stephen J. DeCanio, Economic Modeling and the False Tradeoff Between
EnvironmentalProtection and Economic Growth, CONTEMP. EcoN. POL'Y, Oct. 1997, at 10,

23 (1997).
65 See DAVID ROLAND-HOLST & FREDRICH KAHRL, CLEAN ENERGY AND CLIMATE
POLICIES LEAD TO EcoNOMIC GROWTH IN THE UNITED STATES, available at

http://are.berkeley.edu/-dwrh/CERES-Web/Docs/EAGLE%20Fact%20Sheet%20
on%20ACES.pdf.
" See PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, RESIDENTIAL END-USE EFFICIENCY

1

(2009), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/Residential%20EndUse%20Efficiency%20final0.pdf ("When considering costs over the lifetime of an

investment, end-use energy efficiency can be one of the lowest-cost means of meeting
energy demand and of reducing GHG emissions.").
6
See Edward L. Glaeser, How Big Are the EnvironmentalBenefits ofHigh-Speed Rail?,
N.Y. TIMEs ECONoMix BLOG (Aug. 12, 2009), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com

/2009/08/12/how-big-are-the-environmental-benefits-of-high-speed-rail/.
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deficit spending today." More modern forms of transportation, however,
provide an even higher rate of return on investment.
This is one of the reasons that recent proposals to create, for
example, an "infrastructure bank"69 to finance such long-term spending
projects-as President Obama has recently suggested-can be somewhat
problematic, since such financing might be used to finance investments
that are both ecologically damaging and less wealth-inducing than the
greener alternatives. When assessing environmental legislation and its
impact on future generations, however, the point is simply that there are
both large- and small-scale projects available that would make the world
inhabited by future people both richer and healthier.
In other words, the benefits of pro-environmental legislation accrue
to future generations, whereas the costs can be borne either by future
generations (in the form of lower incomes) or by current generations (in
the form of lower consumption). The latter strategy is less arrogant in
one sense, because it does not require those currently alive to claim to
know how future generations would trade off their own income versus
their own environmental benefits. It would still, however, run the risk of
being an exercise by which one generation sacrifices in order to bestow a
gift on future generations, not knowing if the recipients of the gift would
put any value on what they received. Either way, the problem remains
that current generations can only guess at the preferences of humans
who will be born into quite different worlds.
Finally, it is essential to return to the question of distribution-of
rich and poor. The analysis above has, with small exceptions, ignored
questions of the distributive impact of environmental legislation. If,
however, an otherwise promising pro-environmental policy would result
in reduced incomes for the lowest-income people (today or in the
future), or if the policy would generate future benefits that would not be
felt by the lowest-income people alive in the future, then there are two
possible responses: We can either choose the next-best environmental
policy that does not have the regressive redistributive effect, or we must
compensate the lowest-income people for bearing a disproportionate
burden of the policy. Otherwise, such policies would amount to a twist on
the concept of "environmental racism," which usually describes the direct
infliction of environmental harms on poor neighborhoods.o Similarly, it
6
See Robert H. Frank, Let's Start Spending, DAILY BEAST (July 20, 2010, 11:12 PM),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2010-07-20/spending-cuts-woulddeepen-our-debt/ ("Spending $1 now on road maintenance thus keeps us from
having to spend $2 three years from now.").
0 Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Mary Williams Walsh, Obama Offers a Transit Plan to
CreateJobs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2010, at Al.
7o See Environmentaljustice: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil & Constitutional
Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 4 (testimony of Dr. Benjamin F.
Chavis, Jr., Executive Director, United Church of Christ, Commission for Racial
Justice); Kent Jeffreys, Environmental Racism: A Skeptic's View, 9 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL

COMMENT. 677, 679 (1994).
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is essential to guarantee that the less well-off members of society do not
pay for environmental policies that benefit their richer counterparts.
This is especially important because, even independent of
environmental issues, redistribution should again become an important
goal of economic policy in the United States and elsewhere.
Redistributive policies more generally do not implicate the environment
and they are often growth-inducing. In any case, however, environmental
policies should not generate even greater inequality than already exists in
the increasingly stratified U.S. economy.
V. CONCLUSION
Justice between generations presents an especially difficult set of
moral questions. There is, as yet, no definitive philosophical argument
supporting the idea that each generation must take into account the
interests of generations yet to come. This means that each generation
could, if it wanted to, simply ignore the interests of other generations,
acting in ways that might even prevent future generations from ever
coming into existence.
For the current generation to make such a decision, however, and to
do so in a way that is not a matter of simple selfishness on the part of
those who are already comfortable, the choice to ignore future
generations must be justified by improvements in the lives of people in
need. The only non-selfish reason to ignore the interests of future
generations, therefore, would be that doing so allowed current
generations to try to ameliorate the plight of currently miserable people.
For current generations to continue to ignore the most vulnerable
among those alive, while also harming the health and well-being of future
people, would be the height of arrogance and selfishness.
Current generations claim to care about the welfare of unknown
future generations. If not, there could be no justification for the misery
that is the lot of so many living people. This is not, therefore, an
argument about whether it is right to choose to bring future generations
into existence, but about the moral implications of that choice. Having
chosen to bring them into existence, current generations owe their heirs
their best guess of what kind of environment and economy they would
like to inherit. Certainly, therefore, environmental policies aimed at
addressing existential threats to life on this planet must be given primacy,
notwithstanding their possible impacts on the incomes of future
generations.
In less extreme cases, happily, the classic trade-off between the
environment and the economy is neither as inevitable nor as large as is
often assumed. Moreover, because the path of future incomes is so
promising, many pro-environmental policies that would result in a slight
decrease in future incomes are easier to justify than if future incomes
were not likely to be so high. Also, many policies that involve sacrifices
today have double benefits in the future, as they will lead both to higher
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incomes and a more livable environment. These policies should be
pursued by any generation that believes that it owes future generations a
meaningfully better life-always bearing in mind that the costs and
benefits of such policies can, if they are not carefully designed,
redistribute society's costs and benefits from the poorest to the richest.

Intergenerationaljustice without distributive justice is notjustice at all.

